

Supplemental Appendix

*** N.B. Unless otherwise indicated, all tables reflect coefficients from competing risks models, with robust standard errors clustered by agency and year in parentheses and presidential fixed effects. Positive coefficients correspond to shorter review times, while negative coefficients reflect longer reviews. Reported significance levels as follows: $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$, based on two-tailed tests.

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
Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Review Days	49.108	56.797	1	964
Vacancy	0.455	0.498	0.000	1.000
FTE	57.208	7.550	46.000	69.000
Logged Workload	2.431	0.912	0.000	4.525
President-Agency Disagreement	0.457	0.499	0.000	1.000
Logged Politicization	0.313	0.352	0.000	3.342
Election Year	0.285	0.451	0.000	1.000
Midnight	0.043	0.202	0.000	1.000
Priority	0.423	0.494	0.000	1.000
Judicial Deadline	0.031	0.173	0.000	1.000
Statutory Deadline	0.126	0.332	0.000	1.000
Economically Significant	0.099	0.298	0.000	1.000
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	0.132	0.339	0.000	1.000
Agency Budget	1.474	8.149	-38.052	327.042
Divided Government	0.737	0.440	0.000	1.000

Table A2: Description of the Variables

<i>Variable Name</i>	<i>Description</i>
Vacancy	Dummy variable coded as “1” if there was a vacancy in the OIRA Administrator position on the day the rule was submitted to OIRA for review.
FTE	The number of Full Time Equivalent OIRA staff in the year the rule was submitted.
Log Workload	The number of rules under review at OIRA for the agency submitting the rule, averaged over each day the rule was under review.
President-Agency Disagreement	Dichotomous variable coded “1” if the agency is liberal (conservative) and the president is Republican (Democrat), and “0” otherwise. We code an agency as liberal (conservative) if its Clinton-Lewis score is less (greater) than zero.
Log Politicization	The natural logarithm of the number of presidential appointees (PAS, non-career SES, and Schedule C) in an agency in the year the rule was submitted divided by the total number of employees in that agency in that year.
Election Year	Dummy variable coded as “1” if the rule was submitted during a presidential election year, and “0” otherwise.
Midnight	Dummy variable coded as “1” if the rule was submitted following a presidential election that puts a president into lame duck status until the date in January when the new president assumes office, and “0” otherwise.
Priority	Dummy variable coded as “1” if the agency’s issue area for that particular year is mentioned in the State if the Union address more than the average agency issue area and “0” otherwise.
Judicial Deadline	Dummy variable coded as “1” if the rule had a judicially-imposed deadline, and “0” otherwise.
Statutory Deadline	Dummy variable coded as “1” if the rule had a statutorily-imposed deadline, and “0” otherwise.
Economically Significant	Dummy variable coded as “1” if the rule is economically significant, meaning that it will “have an annual effect on the economy of \$100 million or more, and “0” otherwise. ¹
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	Dummy variable coded as “1” if the agency was required to prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis in accordance with the the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), and “0” otherwise.
Agency Budget	Percentage change in the agency’s budget (in real 2009 dollars) from the previous year.
Divided Government	Dummy variable coded as “1” if the president and either the House or the Senate are from opposing political parties, and “0” otherwise

Figure A1: Median OIRA Review Time by Agency, 1994 - 2013



Source: Authors' analysis of data from www.reginfo.gov. Dotted line indicates the 90-day mark.

Table A3: Competing Risks Model with Bertelli-Grose Agency Scores, 1991–2004

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	-0.147 (0.102)	-0.295*** (0.108)
FTE	0.062*** (0.021)	0.029 (0.018)
Logged Workload	-0.184*** (0.055)	-0.188*** (0.161)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.494** (0.223)	-0.531** (0.241)
Logged Politicization	-0.134 (0.149)	-0.097 (0.170)
Election Year	0.094 (0.071)	-0.026 (0.074)
Midnight	-0.170 (0.269)	0.008 (0.173)
Priority	0.102 (0.082)	0.152 (0.101)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	1.342*** (0.335)	1.691*** (0.285)
Statutory Deadline	0.163** (0.071)	0.062 (0.060)
Economically Significant	0.073 (0.088)	0.299*** (0.081)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.123** (0.056)	0.069 (0.056)
Agency Budget	0.006 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)
Divided Government	0.277*** (0.098)	0.199*** (0.072)
Post-1993	-0.287** (0.144)	-0.307** (0.135)
N	2,732	2,971
Years	1991–2004	1991–2004
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Note: Bertelli and Grose's (2011) estimates are based on the statements of agency heads during congressional testimony and place the agency and president on the same scale. Using these scores limits the number of agencies and years that we include in the analysis (1991–2004).

Table A4: Competing Risks Model with Alternate Coding of President-Agency Variable

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	-0.130** (0.056)	-0.111** (0.048)
FTE	0.021*** (0.008)	0.017** (0.007)
Logged Workload	-0.068*** (0.026)	-0.111*** (0.021)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.105** (0.053)	-0.209*** (0.048)
Logged Politicization	-0.192*** (0.058)	-0.023 (0.044)
Election Year	-0.060 (0.056)	-0.085* (0.050)
Midnight	0.000 (0.097)	0.107* (0.065)
Priority	0.143*** (0.052)	0.179*** (0.065)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	0.603*** (0.122)	0.534*** (0.125)
Statutory Deadline	0.091** (0.041)	0.144*** (0.035)
Economically Significant	-0.079 (0.054)	0.067 (0.047)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.142*** (0.038)	-0.005 (0.032)
Agency Budget	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.001)
Divided Government	0.058 (0.053)	0.032 (0.053)
Post-1993	-0.149 (0.124)	-0.187 (0.127)
N	10,223	12,111
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Note: President-Agency Disagreement coded as “1” if the president is conservative (liberal) and the agency is liberal using the Clinton and Lewis scores. Cases where the confidence interval for the Clinton-Lewis score includes zero are coded as “0” in these models.

Table A5: Competing Risks Models Incorporating Measurement Error for CL Scores

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)
FTE	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Log Workload	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.02)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.04)
Log Politicization	-0.21*** (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
Election Year	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.05)
Midnight	0.01 (0.10)	0.12* (0.07)
Priority	0.15*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	0.58*** (0.12)	0.50*** (0.12)
Statutory Deadline	0.09** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
Economically Significant	-0.08 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)
Agency Budget	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.001)
Divided Government	0.06 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Post-1993	-0.15 (0.12)	-0.18 (0.12)
N	10,223	12,111
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Models incorporate uncertainty, using the method of composition described by Treier and Jackman (2008).

Table A6: Competing Risks Model with Alternate Codings of Vacancy Variable

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>				
Average Vacancy	-0.157** (0.071)	-0.124** (0.057)		
30-day Lagged Vacancy			-0.122** (0.057)	-0.101** (0.050)
FTE	0.021*** (0.008)	0.017** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.017 * ** (0.007)
Logged Workload	-0.072*** (0.027)	-0.127*** (0.021)	-0.074*** (0.026)	-0.127*** (0.021)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>				
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.099** (0.047)	-0.141*** (0.043)	-0.100** (0.047)	-0.141*** (0.043)
Logged Politicization	-0.206*** (0.055)	-0.069 (0.045)	-0.207*** (0.056)	-0.068 (0.045)
Election Year	-0.061 (0.056)	-0.082 (0.051)	-0.060 (0.056)	-0.083 (0.052)
Midnight	0.015 (0.095)	0.117* (0.065)	-0.006 (0.098)	0.104 (0.066)
Priority	0.145*** (0.051)	0.189*** (0.047)	0.146*** (0.051)	0.188*** (0.047)
<i>Control Variables:</i>				
Judicial Deadline	0.585*** (0.123)	0.509*** (0.126)	0.587*** (0.122)	0.507*** (0.126)
Statutory Deadline	0.089** (0.041)	0.143*** (0.035)	0.089** (0.041)	0.144*** (0.035)
Economically Significant	-0.084 (0.055)	0.062 (0.047)	-0.079 (0.054)	0.065 (0.047)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.143*** (0.038)	-0.015 (0.032)	-0.145*** (0.038)	-0.015 (0.032)
Agency Budget	0.002 (0.003)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002* (0.001)
Divided Government	0.052 (0.054)	0.029 (0.053)	0.057 (0.054)	0.030 (0.053)
Post-1993	-0.133 (0.122)	-0.182 (0.128)	-0.156 (0.127)	-0.194 (0.131)
N	10, 223	12, 111	10,223	12,111
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Columns 1 & 2 employ a continuous measure of vacancy that is the average level of vacancy during the course of each individual rule review, with higher levels indicating that there was a vacancy for a more significant portion of the rule's review. For instance, a rule that was under review for 90 days with no vacancy in the Administrator position would receive a value of "0," while a rule under review for 90 days where the Administrator seat was vacant for 45 of those days would receive a value of "0.5". Columns 3 & 4 use a measure that is the proportion of vacant days in the 30 days prior to the rule being submitted to OIRA for review.

Table A7: Competing Risks Model with Agency Budget and Employment Controls

	Proposed Rules	Proposed Rules	Final Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>				
Vacancy	-0.122** (0.053)	-0.1250** (0.055)	-0.095** (0.048)	-0.098* (0.050)
FTE	0.018** (0.008)	0.019** (0.008)	0.014* (0.007)	0.013* (0.007)
Log Workload	-0.141*** (0.027)	-0.108*** (0.025)	-0.193*** (0.023)	-0.15*** (0.023)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>				
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.072* (0.043)	-0.089** (0.043)	-0.120*** (0.041)	-0.126** (0.042)
Log Politicization	-0.108 (0.083)	-0.005 (0.080)	-0.021 (0.063)	0.071 (0.059)
Election Year	-0.028 (0.050)	-0.033 (0.052)	-0.065 (0.050)	-0.081 (0.052)
Midnight	0.006 (0.095)	0.024 (0.097)	0.070 (0.066)	0.077 (0.066)
Priority	0.072 (0.054)	0.070 (0.054)	0.139*** (0.048)	0.127** (0.051)
<i>Control Variables:</i>				
Judicial Deadline	0.664*** (0.116)	0.621*** (0.118)	0.593*** (0.123)	0.544*** (0.125)
Statutory Deadline	0.092** (0.039)	0.097** (0.040)	0.124*** (0.035)	0.138*** (0.035)
Economically Significant	-0.084 (0.054)	0.084 (0.053)	0.051 (0.047)	0.046 (0.047)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.140*** (0.039)	-0.129*** (0.039)	-0.012 (0.033)	0.001 (0.033)
Log Agency Budget	0.129*** (0.029)		0.091*** (0.027)	
Log Agency Employment	0.031 (0.28)	0.096*** (0.023)	0.020 (0.023)	0.064*** (0.019)
Divided Government	0.036 (0.052)	0.035 (0.052)	0.014 (0.051)	0.013 (0.051)
Post-1993	-0.216* (0.114)	-0.179 (0.121)	-0.273** (0.119)	-0.250* (0.122)
N	10, 223	10, 233	12, 111	12, 111
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table A8: Competing Risks Model with Paperwork Reduction Act Control Variable

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	-0.132** (0.059)	-0.123** (0.052)
FTE	0.022*** (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)
Log Workload	-0.070** (0.03)	-0.100*** (0.028)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.121** (0.048)	-0.150*** (0.045)
Log Politicization	-0.214*** (0.057)	-0.083* (0.048)
Election Year	-0.071 (0.056)	-0.074 (0.052)
Midnight	0.018 (0.102)	0.078 (0.075)
Priority	0.144*** (0.052)	0.215*** (0.050)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	0.548*** (0.100)	0.504*** (0.111)
Statutory Deadline	0.054 (0.039)	0.125*** (0.037)
Economically Significant	-0.152*** (0.052)	-0.011*** (0.045)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.172*** (0.042)	-0.045 (0.034)
Agency Budget	0.002 (0.003)	0.003* (0.002)
PRA	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Divided Government	0.055 (0.054)	0.051 (0.050)
Post-1993	-0.176 (0.128)	-0.226* (0.129)
N	9,709	11,200
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Note: Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), OIRA reviews information collection requests (ICRs) submitted by agencies. We gathered data on the number of ICRs at OIRA for every day in our study from www.reginfo.gov. The variable *PRA* is the average daily number of ICRs under review for each rule.

Table A9: Competing Risks Model without Politicization Variable, 1981–2013

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	-0.099** (0.045)	-0.066* (0.039)
FTE	0.023*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)
Logged Workload	-0.035 (0.019)	-0.075*** (0.017)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.185*** (0.036)	-0.199*** (0.030)
Election Year	-0.100** (0.043)	-0.097*** (0.037)
Midnight	0.018 (0.088)	0.108* (0.059)
Priority	0.111*** (0.041)	0.173*** (0.036)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	0.539*** (0.115)	0.476*** (0.119)
Statutory Deadline	0.106*** (0.038)	0.140*** (0.033)
Economically Significant	-0.129*** (0.046)	-0.015 (0.042)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.128*** (0.035)	0.005 (0.030)
Agency Budget	0.003 (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)
Divided Government	0.062 (0.050)	0.040 (0.051)
Post-1993	-0.062 (0.120)	-0.100 (0.124)
N	15,779	19,235
Years	1981–2013	1981–2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Table A10: Competing Risks Model: Pre- and Post-Executive Order 12866

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>				
Vacancy	-0.202*** (0.066)	-0.171*** (0.058)	0.028 (0.062)	0.034 (0.065)
FTE	0.026** (0.011)	0.025** (0.012)	0.32*** (0.009)	0.027*** (0.008)
Logged Workload	0.001 (0.032)	-0.075*** (0.023)	-0.165*** (0.034)	-0.173*** (0.033)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>				
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.147** (0.067)	-0.246*** (0.057)	0.083 (0.053)	0.149*** (0.049)
Logged Politicization	-0.295*** (0.062)	-0.061 (0.057)	0.111 (0.085)	0.066 (0.078)
Election Year	-0.006 (0.076)	-0.018 (0.077)	-0.029 (0.065)	-0.075 (0.060)
Midnight	0.148* (0.082)	0.164** (0.065)	-0.753*** (0.231)	-0.240 (0.192)
Priority	0.171** (0.070)	0.175*** (0.061)	0.077 (0.053)	0.111** (0.048)
<i>Control Variables:</i>				
Judicial Deadline	0.129 (0.163)	0.079 (0.134)	0.873*** (0.139)	0.799*** (0.143)
Statutory Deadline	0.027 (0.051)	0.155*** (0.050)	0.198*** (0.063)	0.145*** (0.051)
Economically Significant	-0.292*** (0.094)	-0.148* (0.076)	0.062 (0.071)	0.222*** (0.058)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.249 (0.050)	0.007 (0.041)	0.021 (0.052)	-0.005 (0.047)
Agency Budget	0.002 (0.004)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Divided Government	0.051 (0.168)	0.048 (0.214)	0.061 (0.071)	0.050 (0.064)
N	6,091	7,724	4,132	4,387
Years	1988 - 1993	1988 - 1993	1994 - 2013	1994 - 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table A11: Pre-2011 Analysis

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	-0.127** (0.056)	-0.109** (0.049)
FTE	0.020*** (0.008)	0.016** (0.007)
Log Workload	-0.080*** (0.027)	-0.131*** (0.021)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.091* (0.048)	-0.135*** (0.045)
Log Politicization	-0.215*** (0.056)	-0.075 (0.046)
Election Year	-0.068 (0.057)	-0.090* (0.053)
Midnight	0.005 (0.096)	0.111* (0.064)
Priority	0.154*** (0.052)	0.194*** (0.048)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	0.606*** (0.128)	0.512*** (0.135)
Statutory Deadline	0.085** (0.042)	0.138*** (0.035)
Economically Significant	-0.103* (0.056)	0.060 (0.049)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.154*** (0.039)	-0.020 (0.032)
Agency Budget	0.002 (0.003)	0.002* (0.001)
Divided Government	0.052 (0.057)	0.028 (0.057)
Post-1993	-0.154 (0.057)	-0.196 (0.129)
N	9,877	11,769
Years	1988 – 2010	1988 – 2010
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Table A12: Analysis of Rules Reviewed under 120 days

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	-0.148*** (0.054)	-0.157*** (0.049)
FTE	0.013* (0.008)	0.015** (0.007)
Log Workload	-0.043 (0.031)	-0.096*** (0.020)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.049 (0.044)	-0.131*** (0.040)
Log Politicization	-0.242*** (0.055)	-0.061 (0.046)
Election Year	0.006 (0.060)	-0.038 (0.048)
Midnight	0.030 (0.085)	0.137** (0.065)
Priority	0.103** (0.044)	0.154*** (0.042)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	0.527*** (0.128)	0.467*** (0.121)
Statutory Deadline	0.070 (0.044)	0.156*** (0.036)
Economically Significant	0.041 (0.054)	0.091* (0.047)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.148*** (0.041)	-0.005 (0.035)
Agency Budget	0.003 (0.003)	0.002** (0.001)
Divided Government	0.056 (0.053)	0.015 (0.054)
Post-1993	-0.317*** (0.103)	-0.304*** (0.115)
N	9,507	11,577
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Table A13: Competing Risks Excluding Reviews Less than 10 Days

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	-0.063 (0.052)	-0.105* (0.056)
FTE	0.022*** (0.008)	0.018** (0.008)
Logged Workload	-0.082*** (0.026)	-0.140*** (0.027)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.119*** (0.045)	-0.153*** (0.049)
Logged Politicization	-0.167*** (0.053)	-0.060 (0.052)
Election Year	-0.087* (0.052)	-0.043 (0.054)
Midnight	-0.073 (0.135)	0.002 (0.109)
Priority	0.142*** (0.049)	0.188*** (0.052)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	0.539*** (0.084)	0.441*** (0.091)
Statutory Deadline	0.076* (0.041)	0.119*** (0.037)
Economically Significant	-0.161*** (0.054)	-0.067 (0.042)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.141*** (0.043)	-0.054 (0.038)
Agency Budget	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
Divided Government	0.032 (0.051)	0.025 (0.046)
Post-1993	-0.160 (0.128)	-0.185 (0.143)
N	7,866	8,284
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Table A14: Competing Risks Model Excluding “Informal Review” Agencies (EPA, DOT, USDA, HHS)

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	−0.082** (0.035)	−0.089 (0.060)
FTE	0.021*** (0.009)	0.022** (0.008)
Log Workload	−0.125** (0.056)	−0.151*** (0.057)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	−0.155** (0.036)	−0.166*** (0.037)
Log Politicization	−0.114 (0.071)	−0.003 (0.081)
Election Year	−0.027 (0.054)	−0.074** (0.032)
Midnight	0.020 (0.132)	0.177** (0.076)
Priority	0.181* (0.102)	0.259** (0.110)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	1.28*** (0.093)	1.280*** (0.283)
Statutory Deadline	0.104 (0.090)	0.179*** (0.064)
Economically Significant	−0.118 (0.125)	−0.122 (0.160)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	−0.058 (0.076)	0.075 (0.070)
Agency Budget	0.004*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Divided Government	0.072 (0.066)	0.005 (0.050)
Post-1993	−0.096 (0.170)	0.007 (0.113)
N	4,877	6,337
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Table A15: Competing Risks Model Including Only “Informal Review” Agencies (EPA, DOT, USDA, HHS)

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	−0.140** (0.060)	−0.109** (0.053)
FTE	0.014* (0.008)	0.007 (0.006)
Log Workload	−0.258* (0.150)	−0.325*** (0.081)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	−0.04 (0.066)	−0.071 (0.054)
Log Politicization	−0.816 (0.591)	−1.425** (0.724)
Election Year	−0.066 (0.041)	−0.095*** (0.016)
Midnight	0.010 (0.108)	0.024 (0.048)
Priority	0.183** (0.078)	0.125*** (0.039)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	0.412*** (0.120)	0.374*** (0.064)
Statutory Deadline	0.071 (0.105)	0.099 (0.087)
Economically Significant	−0.053 (0.199)	−0.150 (0.178)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	−0.205*** (0.057)	−0.077 (0.070)
Agency Budget	0.000 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)
Divided Government	0.024 (0.046)	0.051 (0.089)
Post-1993	−0.390*** (0.107)	−0.582*** (0.152)
N	5,346	5,774
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Table A16: Competing Risks Model with Agency Fixed Effects

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	-0.120** (0.050)	-0.095** (0.043)
FTE	0.018** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)
Logged Workload	-0.213*** (0.041)	-0.220*** (0.029)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.034 (0.041)	-0.040 (0.038)
Logged Politicization	-0.150 (0.200)	-0.084 (0.162)
Election Year	-0.40 (0.048)	-0.074 (0.045)
Midnight	0.002 (0.095)	0.093 (0.066)
Priority	0.045* (0.078)	0.070 (0.059)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	0.747*** (0.117)	0.601*** (0.117)
Statutory Deadline	0.066 (0.041)	0.117*** (0.036)
Economically Significant	-0.054 (0.053)	0.086* (0.047)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.165*** (0.038)	0.010 (0.033)
Agency Budget	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.001)
Divided Government	0.039 (0.051)	0.047 (0.051)
Post-1993	-0.296*** (0.111)	-0.265** (0.107)
N	10,223	12,111
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Agency Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Table A17: Competing Risks Model with Agency and Year-Clustered Standard Errors

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>				
Vacancy	-0.129*** (0.036)	-0.110*** (0.042)	-0.129 (0.099)	-0.110 (0.017)
FTE	0.021*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.021 (0.015)	0.017 (0.014)
Logged Workload	-0.074* (0.044)	-0.127*** (0.035)	-0.074** (0.032)	-0.127*** (0.023)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>				
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.100** (0.045)	-0.141*** (0.027)	-0.100* (0.052)	0.141** (0.069)
Logged Politicization	-0.206** (0.066)	-0.068 (0.095)	-0.206*** (0.054)	-0.068 (0.043)
Election Year	-0.006 (0.040)	-0.083*** (0.021)	-0.060 (0.081)	-0.083 (0.084)
Midnight	0.000 (0.078)	0.108** (0.048)	0.000 (0.207)	0.108 (0.138)
Priority	0.146** (0.069)	0.188** (0.074)	0.146*** (0.044)	0.188*** (0.050)
<i>Control Variables:</i>				
Judicial Deadline	0.587*** (0.155)	0.508*** (0.131)	0.587*** (0.163)	0.508*** (0.145)
Statutory Deadline	0.089 (0.073)	0.144** (0.062)	0.089** (0.036)	0.144*** (0.032)
Economically Significant	-0.080 (0.127)	0.062 (0.128)	-0.080 (0.074)	0.064 (0.064)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.145*** (0.050)	-0.015 (0.047)	-0.145*** (0.044)	-0.015 (0.017)
Agency Budget	0.002 (0.002)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002* (0.001)
Divided Government	0.057 (0.036)	0.031 (0.049)	0.057 (0.089)	0.031 (0.081)
Post-1993	-0.151* (0.087)	-0.192** (0.107)	-0.151 (0.238)	-0.192 (0.198)
N	10,223	12,111	10,223	12,111
Years	1988 - 2013	1988 - 2013	1988 - 2013	1988 - 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Agency Clustered SEs	✓	✓	NO	NO
Year Clustered SEs	NO	NO	✓	✓

Table A18: Competing Risks Model with Number of Days Proposed Rules Were Under Review as a Control Variable

Variable	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>	
Vacancy	-0.241*** (0.088)
FTE	0.025 (0.017)
Log Workload	-0.107** (0.042)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>	
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.122 (0.080)
Log Politicization	-0.167** (0.790)
Election Year	-0.167*** (0.099)
Midnight	0.348*** (0.079)
Priority	0.110 (0.078)
<i>Control Variables:</i>	
Days Proposed Rule Under Review	-0.000 (0.000)
Judicial Deadline	0.269 (0.174)
Statutory Deadline	0.299*** (0.105)
Economically Significant	0.166** (0.081)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	0.015 (0.081)
Agency Budget	0.002 (0.004)
Divided Government	0.065 (0.088)
Post-1993	0.065 (0.238)
N	11,902
Years	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓

Table A19: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	0.124*** (0.032)	0.218*** (0.031)
FTE	0.010* (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Log Workload	-0.005 (0.016)	0.157*** (0.015)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.024 (0.028)	-0.00 (0.026)
Log Politicization	0.486*** (0.046)	0.219*** (0.045)
Election Year	0.328*** (0.035)	0.269*** (0.032)
Midnight	-0.164** (0.070)	-0.227*** (0.049)
Priority	-0.322*** (0.027)	-0.121*** (0.027)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	-0.453*** (0.074)	-0.650*** (0.062)
Statutory Deadline	-0.453*** (0.035)	-0.378*** (0.033)
Economically Significant	-0.732*** (0.038)	-0.434*** (0.038)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.142*** (0.033)	0.024 (0.032)
Agency Budget	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Divided Government	-0.024 (0.028)	0.131*** (0.042)
Post-1993	0.395*** (0.088)	0.054 (0.068)
N	9,279	9,279
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Table A20: Competing Risks Model with Divided Government x Capacity

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	-0.158 (0.074)	-0.250 (0.093)
FTE	0.037** (0.013)	0.016 (0.012)
Logged Workload	-0.173** (0.052)	-0.159*** (0.053)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.107* (0.046)	-0.143*** (0.044)
Log Politicization	-0.207*** (0.055)	-0.069 (0.046)
Election Year	-0.073 (0.057)	-0.089 (0.054)
Midnight	0.012 (0.099)	0.135 (0.072)
Priority	0.158 (0.049)	0.193*** (0.046)
<i>Divided Government x Capacity:</i>		
Divided x Vacancy	0.043 (0.122)	0.187* (0.110)
Divided x FTE	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.014)
Divided x Workload	0.130 (0.067)	0.040 (0.060)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	0.592*** (0.123)	0.507*** (0.127)
Statutory Deadline	0.088** (0.041)	0.143*** (0.035)
Economically Significant	-0.074 (0.054)	0.061 (0.047)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.142*** (0.038)	-0.016 (0.032)
Agency Budget	0.002 (0.003)	0.002* (0.001)
Divided	0.833 (0.777)	-0.004 (0.728)
Post-1993	-0.182 (0.124)	-0.273 (0.116)
N	10,223	12,111
Years	1988-2013	1988-2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Table A21: Competing Risks Model with Congressional Fixed Effects

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	-0.209*** (0.052)	-0.156*** (0.053)
FTE	0.049*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.009)
Logged Workload	-0.055** (0.025)	-0.111*** (0.018)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	-0.117*** (0.042)	-0.141*** (0.039)
Logged Politicization	-0.198 (0.060)	-0.077* (0.043)
Election Year	0.231*** (0.066)	0.193*** (0.055)
Midnight	0.203* (0.118)	0.219 (0.095)
Priority	0.133*** (0.045)	0.190*** (0.041)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	0.536*** (0.123)	0.476*** (0.125)
Statutory Deadline	0.087** (0.041)	0.124*** (0.034)
Economically Significant	-0.064 (0.054)	0.085* (0.047)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	-0.149*** (0.038)	-0.027 (0.032)
Agency Budget	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.001)
Divided Government	0.302** (0.132)	0.196 (0.108)
Post-1993	-0.084*** (0.134)	-0.146 (0.156)
N	10, 223	12, 111
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Congress Fixed Effects	✓	✓

Table A22: Competing Risks Models with Withdrawals as Outcome of Interest

Variable	Proposed Rules	Final Rules
<i>OIRA Capacity:</i>		
Vacancy	0.157 (0.129)	0.145 (0.175)
FTE	-0.007 (0.017)	0.019 (0.022)
Log Workload	0.011 (0.058)	0.108 (0.063)
<i>Political Targeting and Timing:</i>		
President-Agency Disagreement	0.160 (0.111)	0.118 (0.145)
Log Politicization	0.266* (0.140)	0.072 (0.155)
Election Year	0.266** (0.116)	0.270 (0.167)
Midnight	0.669*** (0.245)	0.862*** (0.260)
Priority	-0.151 (0.108)	-0.342** (0.139)
<i>Control Variables:</i>		
Judicial Deadline	-0.842** (0.354)	-1.314*** (0.415)
Statutory Deadline	-0.304** (0.124)	-0.647*** (0.157)
Economically Significant	0.128 (0.147)	0.091 (0.152)
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis	0.232* (0.121)	-0.142 (0.139)
Agency Budget	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.007)
Divided Government	-0.069 (0.148)	-0.116 (0.191)
Post-1993	-0.338 (0.261)	-0.277 (0.328)
N	10,223	12,111
Years	1988 – 2013	1988 – 2013
President Fixed Effects	✓	✓