

PLAP 7010: American Political Institutions

Fall 2014
Tuesdays, 3:30 pm
New Cabell Hall 594

Professor Jeffery A. Jenkins
Email: jajenkins@virginia.edu
Office: Gibson 261
Phone: (847) 471-3287
Office hours: Friday 3-5 and by appointment

Professor Rachel A. Potter
Email: rapotter@virginia.edu
Office: Gibson 384
Phone: (434) 924-3614
Office hours: Wed 2-4 and by appointment

This course provides a general introduction to the field of American Political Institutions. It is structured as a “survey” course, providing both an overview of classic works and coverage of important new research in and across the major subfields of American Political Institutions. Given finite time and vast literatures, breadth will be emphasized over depth, so that once the course is completed, students should have a basic working knowledge of the important literatures in and across each field. This will provide a solid framework for further graduate courses (such as Seminars on Congress, the Presidency, etc.) and a subsequent comprehensive exam in American Politics.

Course Requirements

There are several requirements for this class:

- (1) You must come to class prepared, which means that you have done *all* of the week’s readings in advance. You are also expected to participate in class discussion. Participation is what makes a seminar a useful learning experience – you learn as much from the in-class discussion as you do from the readings themselves. Moreover, given that this is your chosen vocation, you should take an active role in fostering your professional development.
- (2) Our role each week will be that of moderators, providing background context and steering the discussion in various directions. We won’t identify weekly “discussion leaders.” Rather, each student must contribute to in-class discussion and should expect to be called on for input.
- (3) The course grade will be a function of three short essays (25%), class participation (50%), and a take-home final exam or final paper (25%). The goal of the essays will be to summarize, analyze, and critique a given week’s readings both individually and collectively. Each essay will be due *before* the class meets to discuss that particular week’s readings. Finally, the timing and specifics for the take-home final exam option will be discussed in class.

Course Materials

The readings for the course will be a balance between books and journal articles. Most of the journal articles are available electronically, usually at JSTOR and sometimes at the journal’s

webpage. For those articles (or book chapters) that are not available electronically, I will have copies scanned (into PDFs) and sent to you roughly a week before such readings are covered in class.

We will be reading most or all of 16 books, all of which are available at the UVA Bookstore:

- Aldrich, John H. 2011. *Why Parties?: A Second Look*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bailey, Michael A., and Forrest Maltzman. 2011. *The Constrained Court: Law, Politics, and the Decisions Justices Make*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Binder, Sarah A. 2003. *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Cameron, Charles M. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2006. *Who Leads Whom?: Presidents, Policy, and the Public*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2007. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*, Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2012. *Learning While Governing: Expertise and Accountability in the Executive Branch*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Howell, William H. 2003. *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lewis, David E. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mayhew, David R. 2004. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, Second Edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mayhew, David R. 2005. *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-2002*, Second Edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.

In addition, the following book is recommended for a basic introduction to rational choice and the new institutionalism:

- Shepsle, Kenneth. 2010. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*, Second Edition. New York: Norton.

Below is a week-by-week list of required reading assignments:

Week 1 (August 26): Course Overview, Discussion of the Syllabus, and Introduction to New Institutional Research

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1989. "Studying Institutions Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1: 131-47. (JSTOR)

Weingast, Barry R. 1996. "Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives." In *A New Handbook of Political Science*.

Week 2 (September 2): Congress: The Electoral Connection

Mayhew, David R. 2004. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, Second Edition. All.

Rothenberg, Lawrence S., and Mitchell S. Sanders. 2000. "Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 316-25. (JSTOR)

Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 2001. "The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection." In Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, Seventh Edition. Washington: CQ Press.

Jenkins, Jeffery A., and Jamie L. Carson. 2011. "Examining the Electoral Connection Across Time." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 25-46. (Available on-line)

Week 3 (September 9): Congressional Organization

Weingast, Barry, and William Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress: Or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." *Journal of Political Economy* 96: 132-63. (JSTOR)

Suggested: Groseclose, Tim. 1994. "The Committee Outlier Debate: A Review and a Reexamination of Some of the Evidence." *Public Choice* 80: 265-73. (JSTOR)

Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Chapters 1-4.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2007. *Legislative Leviathan*, Second Edition. Chapters 1-5, 7-8.

Week 4 (September 16): Bureaucracy

Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Intro, Chapters 1, 2, 8, Conclusion.

McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 165-79. (JSTOR)

McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3: 243-77. (JSTOR)

Moe, Terry. 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." In John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *Can the Government Govern?* Washington: Brookings.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2003. "Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts." *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 205-14. (JSTOR)

Week 5 (September 23): Presidency

Neustadt, Richard E. 1960 [1990]. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*, Chapter 3.

Kernell, Samuel. 1997. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*. Washington: CQ Press. Chapters 1-3, 5.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2006. *Who Leads Whom?* All.

Week 6 (September 30): Political Parties

Aldrich, John H. 2011. *Why Parties?* Chapters 1-2, 6-9.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*. Chapters 1-6.

Bawn, Kathleen, et al. 2012. "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 10: 571-97. (Available on-line)

Week 7 (October 7): Supreme Court

Segal, Jeffrey A., and Albert D. Cover. 1989. "Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices." *American Political Science Review* 83: 557-65. (JSTOR)

Clark, Tom S. 2009. "The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy." *American Journal of Political Science* 53: 971-89. (JSTOR)

Bailey, Michael A., and Forrest Maltzman. 2011. *The Constrained Court*. All.

Week 8 (October 14): READING DAY – NO CLASS

Week 9 (October 21): Divided Government I

Mayhew, David R. 2005. *Divided We Govern*, Second Edition. All.

Binder, Sarah A. 2003. *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock*. All.

Week 10 (October 28): Divided Government II

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics*. All.

Wawro, Gregory J., and Eric Schickler. 2004. "Where's the Pivot? Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-Cloture Senate." *American Journal of Political Science* 48: 758-74. (JSTOR)

Madonna, Anthony J. 2011. "Winning Coalition Formation in the US Senate: The Effects of Legislative Decision Rules and Agenda Change." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 276-288. (JSTOR)

Week 11 (November 4): Delegation

Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers*. All.

Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. "Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 330-45. (JSTOR)

Farhang, Sean. 2008. "Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation of Powers System." *American Journal of Political Science* 52: 821-39. (JSTOR)

Wiseman, Alan. 2008. "Delegation and Positive-Sum Bureaucracies." *Journal of Politics* 71(3): 998-1014. (JSTOR)

Week 12 (November 11): Accountability

Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2012. *Learning While Governing*. All.

Howell, William G. and David E. Lewis. 2002. "Agencies by Presidential Design." *Journal of Politics* 64(4): 1095 – 1114. (JSTOR)

Moe, Terry M. 2012. "Delegation, Control, and the Study of Public Bureaucracy." *The Forum* 10(2). (JSTOR)

Week 13 (November 18): Presidential-Congressional Relations I

Cameron, Charles M. 2000. *Veto Bargaining*. All.

Groseclose, Tim, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience." *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 100-19. (JSTOR)

Week 14 (November 25): Presidential-Congressional Relations II

Howell, William G. 2003. *Power without Persuasion*. All.

Berry, Christopher R., Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell. 2010. "The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending." *American Political Science Review* 104(4): 783 – 799. (JSTOR)

Howell, William G., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2005. "Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force." *International Organization* 59: 209-32. (JSTOR)

Week 15 (December 2): Presidential Appointments

Moe, Terry M. 1985. "The Politicized Presidency." In John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *The New Direction in American Politics*. Washington: Brookings.

Lewis, David E. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments*. All.