Buying Evidence? Government Research as a Presidential Commodity
Journal of Politics, Forthcoming.
The federal government routinely commissions research from the private sector and this research, in turn, often forms an evidence base for future policy decisions. Given its potential to influence the policymaking process, I argue that research production is a previously unappreciated tool in the president’s policy arsenal. Focusing on federally-funded research and using an original dataset of federal procurement from 2001-2019, I explore how government-funded research tracks to political trends in the executive. The analysis shows that new presidential administrations are more likely to discontinue research initiated by their predecessors. Further, agencies that are prioritized on the president’s policy agenda award larger research contracts. The implications are that federal research is a commodity for the executive, harnessed in service of his or her agenda, and that the federal research enterprise is subject to political influence.
| Paper | Appendix | Replication Data |
Journal of Politics, Forthcoming.
The federal government routinely commissions research from the private sector and this research, in turn, often forms an evidence base for future policy decisions. Given its potential to influence the policymaking process, I argue that research production is a previously unappreciated tool in the president’s policy arsenal. Focusing on federally-funded research and using an original dataset of federal procurement from 2001-2019, I explore how government-funded research tracks to political trends in the executive. The analysis shows that new presidential administrations are more likely to discontinue research initiated by their predecessors. Further, agencies that are prioritized on the president’s policy agenda award larger research contracts. The implications are that federal research is a commodity for the executive, harnessed in service of his or her agenda, and that the federal research enterprise is subject to political influence.
| Paper | Appendix | Replication Data |
Bypassing Bureaucrats
Working paper.
Controlling bureaucrats is a vexing problem for political leaders. Although leaders need bureaucrats to implement their policy agendas, merit-protected bureaucrats can resist such directives. However, reliance on bureaucrats is not always necessary; contractors—private sector entities hired on a contractual basis—can sometimes serve as leaders’ administrative agents. I argue that presidents and agency leaders bypass bureaucrats with contractors when an agency’s bureaucrats are out of ideological lockstep and, therefore, less likely to comply with top-down policy directives. I test this argument using service contract spending data. The results show that ideological discord drives spending for policy-relevant contracts, but not for non-policy contracts and not for independent agencies, which are more politically insulated. Additionally,
I demonstrate that bypassing does not require manipulation of procurement awards, suggesting that it occurs within the bounds of standard processes. In circumventing bureaucrats, contractors play an important and largely overlooked political role in implementation.
| Paper | Appendix |
Working paper.
Controlling bureaucrats is a vexing problem for political leaders. Although leaders need bureaucrats to implement their policy agendas, merit-protected bureaucrats can resist such directives. However, reliance on bureaucrats is not always necessary; contractors—private sector entities hired on a contractual basis—can sometimes serve as leaders’ administrative agents. I argue that presidents and agency leaders bypass bureaucrats with contractors when an agency’s bureaucrats are out of ideological lockstep and, therefore, less likely to comply with top-down policy directives. I test this argument using service contract spending data. The results show that ideological discord drives spending for policy-relevant contracts, but not for non-policy contracts and not for independent agencies, which are more politically insulated. Additionally,
I demonstrate that bypassing does not require manipulation of procurement awards, suggesting that it occurs within the bounds of standard processes. In circumventing bureaucrats, contractors play an important and largely overlooked political role in implementation.
| Paper | Appendix |
Privatizing Personnel: Bureaucratic Outsourcing & the Administrative Presidency
Working paper.
Why does the executive branch sometimes rely on bureaucrats to perform work and at other times rely on private sector contractors? I argue that the privatization of personnel is a bureaucratic management strategy used by the president in response to the political environment. Relative to bureaucrats, contractors confer three distinct advantages: speed (i.e., they are quicker to hire), control (i.e., they are more obsequious than merit-protected bureaucrats), and reduced visibility (i.e., they do not add to “Big Government”). These benefits make contractor labor attractive to presidents in agencies that are political priorities and during divided government. To test these arguments, I develop a novel measure of personnel privatization that combines data on contracts for government services with personnel spending across more than 70 agencies from 2001–2020. The findings suggest that contractors are used by the president to stealthily expand executive capacity and point to an under-appreciated avenue for executive aggrandizement.
|Paper|
Working paper.
Why does the executive branch sometimes rely on bureaucrats to perform work and at other times rely on private sector contractors? I argue that the privatization of personnel is a bureaucratic management strategy used by the president in response to the political environment. Relative to bureaucrats, contractors confer three distinct advantages: speed (i.e., they are quicker to hire), control (i.e., they are more obsequious than merit-protected bureaucrats), and reduced visibility (i.e., they do not add to “Big Government”). These benefits make contractor labor attractive to presidents in agencies that are political priorities and during divided government. To test these arguments, I develop a novel measure of personnel privatization that combines data on contracts for government services with personnel spending across more than 70 agencies from 2001–2020. The findings suggest that contractors are used by the president to stealthily expand executive capacity and point to an under-appreciated avenue for executive aggrandizement.
|Paper|
Regulatory Body Shops
(with Bridget Dooling)
Forthcoming in Duke Law Journal.
Agencies do not always write their own rules. Contractors assist agencies in nearly all tasks relating to rulemaking, including reviewing public comments, conducting specialized research, and writing regulatory text. In spite of perceptions that contractors’ roles are entirely ministerial, the reality is that contractors fulfill many more functions in the rulemaking process than is commonly understood, including everything right “up to pushing the big red policymaking button,” as one agency employee put it. The use of contractors in rulemaking fits within a broader pattern of increased government reliance on service contractors. Scholars have documented a bevy of governance concerns relating to ethics, capacity, and more, stemming from the fact that contractors are in privity with the government, not the public. This scholarship does not take up the implications of service contracting for rulemaking, the primary mode of executive branch lawmaking, nor does it delineate between types of contracting arrangements, which vary dramatically.
This Article takes variation in rulemaking contracting arrangements seriously. We define three types: ministerial contractors, who perform administrative work; expertise contractors, who provide discrete scientific and technical inputs; and regulatory body shops, which are embedded into agencies, functioning like staff and encompassing many functions. We argue that while the former two arrangements pose minimal risks to an agency, regulatory body shops are a different story. Not only do they open the door to conflicts of interest issues that are not adequately addressed under current law, they threaten the quality of agency reasoning and have the potential to hollow out an agency’s rulemaking apparatus over the long run. Reliance on regulatory body shops also has the potential to put an agency’s rules in legal jeopardy by violating the Administrative Procedure Act and diminishing an agency’s claim to Chevron deference These various risks, which pose challenges for the quality of public decision-making, sit in tension with the reality that some agencies lack adequate resources to rely exclusively on their staff for rulemaking, turning to regulatory body shops as a pragmatic matter. The Article concludes with reform solutions to help agencies responsibly manage the risks posed by regulatory body shops.
|Paper|
(with Bridget Dooling)
Forthcoming in Duke Law Journal.
Agencies do not always write their own rules. Contractors assist agencies in nearly all tasks relating to rulemaking, including reviewing public comments, conducting specialized research, and writing regulatory text. In spite of perceptions that contractors’ roles are entirely ministerial, the reality is that contractors fulfill many more functions in the rulemaking process than is commonly understood, including everything right “up to pushing the big red policymaking button,” as one agency employee put it. The use of contractors in rulemaking fits within a broader pattern of increased government reliance on service contractors. Scholars have documented a bevy of governance concerns relating to ethics, capacity, and more, stemming from the fact that contractors are in privity with the government, not the public. This scholarship does not take up the implications of service contracting for rulemaking, the primary mode of executive branch lawmaking, nor does it delineate between types of contracting arrangements, which vary dramatically.
This Article takes variation in rulemaking contracting arrangements seriously. We define three types: ministerial contractors, who perform administrative work; expertise contractors, who provide discrete scientific and technical inputs; and regulatory body shops, which are embedded into agencies, functioning like staff and encompassing many functions. We argue that while the former two arrangements pose minimal risks to an agency, regulatory body shops are a different story. Not only do they open the door to conflicts of interest issues that are not adequately addressed under current law, they threaten the quality of agency reasoning and have the potential to hollow out an agency’s rulemaking apparatus over the long run. Reliance on regulatory body shops also has the potential to put an agency’s rules in legal jeopardy by violating the Administrative Procedure Act and diminishing an agency’s claim to Chevron deference These various risks, which pose challenges for the quality of public decision-making, sit in tension with the reality that some agencies lack adequate resources to rely exclusively on their staff for rulemaking, turning to regulatory body shops as a pragmatic matter. The Article concludes with reform solutions to help agencies responsibly manage the risks posed by regulatory body shops.
|Paper|
Bureaucratic Politics: Blindspots and Opportunities in Political Science
(with Sarah Brierley, Kenny Lowande, and Guillermo Toral)
Annual Review of Political Science, 2023.
Bureaucracy is everywhere. Unelected bureaucrats are a key link between government and citizens, between policy and implementation. The profession has taken notice. Bureaucratic politics constitutes a growing share of research in political science. But the way bureaucracy
is studied varies widely, opening theoretical and empirical blindspots, as well as opportunities for innovation. Scholars of American politics tend to focus on bureaucratic policymaking at the national level, while Comparativists often home in on local implementation by street-level
bureaucrats. Data availability and professional incentives have reinforced these subfield-specific blindspots over time. We highlight these divides in three prominent research areas: the selection and retention of bureaucratic personnel, oversight of bureaucratic activities, and opportunities for influence by actors external to the bureaucracy. Our survey reveals ways scholars from both the American and Comparative traditions can learn from one another.
|Paper|Online Appendix|
(with Sarah Brierley, Kenny Lowande, and Guillermo Toral)
Annual Review of Political Science, 2023.
Bureaucracy is everywhere. Unelected bureaucrats are a key link between government and citizens, between policy and implementation. The profession has taken notice. Bureaucratic politics constitutes a growing share of research in political science. But the way bureaucracy
is studied varies widely, opening theoretical and empirical blindspots, as well as opportunities for innovation. Scholars of American politics tend to focus on bureaucratic policymaking at the national level, while Comparativists often home in on local implementation by street-level
bureaucrats. Data availability and professional incentives have reinforced these subfield-specific blindspots over time. We highlight these divides in three prominent research areas: the selection and retention of bureaucratic personnel, oversight of bureaucratic activities, and opportunities for influence by actors external to the bureaucracy. Our survey reveals ways scholars from both the American and Comparative traditions can learn from one another.
|Paper|Online Appendix|
Rulemaking by Contract
(with Bridget Dooling)
Administrative Law Review, 2022.
Contractors have become a ubiquitous presence in the administrative state. How these private sector entities intersect with the rulemaking process, however, is not well understood. Unpacking contractors’ role in rulemaking is important, not least because rulemaking is the executive branch’s core lawmaking function. It is also important because there is a potential accountability blindspot when it comes to contractors in rulemaking. The web of law and policy surrounding contractors is complicated. Protections in place relating to procurement, ethics, recordkeeping, and disclosure are broadly conceived and not readily applied to the nuances of rulemaking.
Building on a survey of agency rulemaking contacts and interviews with 45 agency officials, contractors, and experts, this empirical study provides a comprehensive account of contractors’ roles in rulemaking. We describe how agencies perceive contractors in rulemaking, the tasks that contractors perform, and why and how agencies use them to support rulemaking. Our primary finding is that contractors are involved in almost every aspect of the rulemaking process, from soup to nuts. We conclude that, at many agencies, contractors are a core feature—and perhaps also a bug?—in the contemporary rulemaking process and, as such, legal scholars, policymakers, and practitioners ought to take their roles seriously.
|Paper|
(with Bridget Dooling)
Administrative Law Review, 2022.
Contractors have become a ubiquitous presence in the administrative state. How these private sector entities intersect with the rulemaking process, however, is not well understood. Unpacking contractors’ role in rulemaking is important, not least because rulemaking is the executive branch’s core lawmaking function. It is also important because there is a potential accountability blindspot when it comes to contractors in rulemaking. The web of law and policy surrounding contractors is complicated. Protections in place relating to procurement, ethics, recordkeeping, and disclosure are broadly conceived and not readily applied to the nuances of rulemaking.
Building on a survey of agency rulemaking contacts and interviews with 45 agency officials, contractors, and experts, this empirical study provides a comprehensive account of contractors’ roles in rulemaking. We describe how agencies perceive contractors in rulemaking, the tasks that contractors perform, and why and how agencies use them to support rulemaking. Our primary finding is that contractors are involved in almost every aspect of the rulemaking process, from soup to nuts. We conclude that, at many agencies, contractors are a core feature—and perhaps also a bug?—in the contemporary rulemaking process and, as such, legal scholars, policymakers, and practitioners ought to take their roles seriously.
|Paper|
Not by the Numbers: Evaluating Trump's Administrative Presidency
(with Andrew Rudalevige, Sharece Thrower, and Adam Warber)
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2022.
We examine President Trump’s use of administrative tools related to policymaking — including executive orders, memoranda, proclamations, signing statements, and rulemaking— and compare him to presidents since Eisenhower. Overall, we find that Trump was not that
different from his predecessors—at least, not by the numbers. However, the content of his actions were noteworthy in two ways. First, the use of these tools as public relations instruments accelerated during his presidency. Second, Trump’s rulemaking activities, while not necessarily durable, represent a departure from established norms. Our study highlights the virtues and limitations of using the volume of administrative output to understand the administrative presidency.
|Paper|
(with Andrew Rudalevige, Sharece Thrower, and Adam Warber)
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2022.
We examine President Trump’s use of administrative tools related to policymaking — including executive orders, memoranda, proclamations, signing statements, and rulemaking— and compare him to presidents since Eisenhower. Overall, we find that Trump was not that
different from his predecessors—at least, not by the numbers. However, the content of his actions were noteworthy in two ways. First, the use of these tools as public relations instruments accelerated during his presidency. Second, Trump’s rulemaking activities, while not necessarily durable, represent a departure from established norms. Our study highlights the virtues and limitations of using the volume of administrative output to understand the administrative presidency.
|Paper|
Learning from Failure: A "Failure CV" for the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
Chapter in Executive Policymaking: The Role of the OMB in the Presidency, 2020 Meena Bose and Andrew Rudalevige (eds). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Centralized review of regulations by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is a mainstay of the modern rulemaking process. Observers often elevate OIRA’s status to near omnipotence—describing it as both the “cockpit of the regulatory state” and the “killing ground for agency regulations.” While OIRA is undoubtedly powerful, like all institutions its story is marked by both successes and failures. In this chapter, I chronicle OIRA’s history, taking stock of these institutional victories and setbacks. This accounting highlights the fact that many of OIRA’s failures stem from its insistence on maintaining its own flexibility and discretion, which can come at a cost in terms of the consistency and quality of the policies and analyses produced by agencies.
|Paper|
Chapter in Executive Policymaking: The Role of the OMB in the Presidency, 2020 Meena Bose and Andrew Rudalevige (eds). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Centralized review of regulations by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is a mainstay of the modern rulemaking process. Observers often elevate OIRA’s status to near omnipotence—describing it as both the “cockpit of the regulatory state” and the “killing ground for agency regulations.” While OIRA is undoubtedly powerful, like all institutions its story is marked by both successes and failures. In this chapter, I chronicle OIRA’s history, taking stock of these institutional victories and setbacks. This accounting highlights the fact that many of OIRA’s failures stem from its insistence on maintaining its own flexibility and discretion, which can come at a cost in terms of the consistency and quality of the policies and analyses produced by agencies.
|Paper|
Macro Outsourcing: Evaluating Government Reliance on the Private Sector
2022. Journal of Politics 84(2): 960-974.
Government outsourcing of services to private sector entities is increasingly common. The conventional wisdom ties governments' outsourcing decisions to either an ideological preference for market-based solutions or to fiscal pressures; however, these conjectures have not been systematically subjected to empirical scrutiny. I develop an aggregate annual measure of U.S. state level outsourcing decisions---macro outsourcing---and explore whether the evidence supports these pathways. I also point to an under-appreciated political pathway by which potential losers---bureaucrats organized into public sector unions---affect the decision to outsource. The results offer little support for the received wisdom and instead demonstrate that states with strong unions are less likely to rely on private actors. I bolster this finding with additional analyses showing that states with laws that sap union power exhibit higher levels of outsourcing. Overall, these results show that outsourcing is a decidedly political phenomenon, albeit via an unexpected route.
| Paper | Supporting Information | Replication Data |
2022. Journal of Politics 84(2): 960-974.
Government outsourcing of services to private sector entities is increasingly common. The conventional wisdom ties governments' outsourcing decisions to either an ideological preference for market-based solutions or to fiscal pressures; however, these conjectures have not been systematically subjected to empirical scrutiny. I develop an aggregate annual measure of U.S. state level outsourcing decisions---macro outsourcing---and explore whether the evidence supports these pathways. I also point to an under-appreciated political pathway by which potential losers---bureaucrats organized into public sector unions---affect the decision to outsource. The results offer little support for the received wisdom and instead demonstrate that states with strong unions are less likely to rely on private actors. I bolster this finding with additional analyses showing that states with laws that sap union power exhibit higher levels of outsourcing. Overall, these results show that outsourcing is a decidedly political phenomenon, albeit via an unexpected route.
| Paper | Supporting Information | Replication Data |
A Female Policy Premium? Agency Context and Women's Leadership in the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy
(with Craig Volden)
2021. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 31(1): 91-107.
While there are descriptive and substantive benefits associated with women serving in leadership posts in the bureaucracy, we ask whether there is a policy benefit associated with women’s leadership. Simply put, is there a policy premium to having women as bureaucratic leaders? We focus on agency rulemaking, a policymaking activity conducted by nearly all federal agencies. Across three presidential administrations, we find no evidence of an across-the-board premium associated with women’s leadership. However, our results are consistent with a conditional policy premium—wherein women leaders are particularly effective in advancing ambitious rules and in shepherding rules through to finalization—in agencies that have a working environment that is supportive of women and, to some extent, in agencies that focus on women’s issues. One key implication is that, rather than working to tear down “glass walls,” reformers would be better served by improving the workplace climate for women within agencies.
| Paper | Supporting Information |
(with Craig Volden)
2021. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 31(1): 91-107.
While there are descriptive and substantive benefits associated with women serving in leadership posts in the bureaucracy, we ask whether there is a policy benefit associated with women’s leadership. Simply put, is there a policy premium to having women as bureaucratic leaders? We focus on agency rulemaking, a policymaking activity conducted by nearly all federal agencies. Across three presidential administrations, we find no evidence of an across-the-board premium associated with women’s leadership. However, our results are consistent with a conditional policy premium—wherein women leaders are particularly effective in advancing ambitious rules and in shepherding rules through to finalization—in agencies that have a working environment that is supportive of women and, to some extent, in agencies that focus on women’s issues. One key implication is that, rather than working to tear down “glass walls,” reformers would be better served by improving the workplace climate for women within agencies.
| Paper | Supporting Information |
Providing Political Guidance? Agency Politicization and "As If" Policymaking
2020. Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy 1(1): 1-26 (lead article, inaugural issue).
Government agencies routinely make policies that affect the lives of citizens. I explore agency policymaking via guidance: sub-regulatory policies that can be issued quickly and quietly. Although guidance is not legally binding on external parties, agencies often treat it as if it were. This “as if” nature invites political opportunism, wherein guidance is exploited when agencies are politicized through presidential appoint- ments. I demonstrate this argument empirically using a new dataset that evaluates agency guidance production at 29 agencies over a 10-year period. The results show that agencies are more likely to rely on the “quick fix” offered by guidance when they are highly politicized, and that this effect is exacerbated among the most significant forms of guidance. However, certain institutions like increased proceduralization can temper the bias toward political guidance. While often overlooked, the results suggest that guidance is an important venue for political maneuvering.
|Paper|
2020. Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy 1(1): 1-26 (lead article, inaugural issue).
Government agencies routinely make policies that affect the lives of citizens. I explore agency policymaking via guidance: sub-regulatory policies that can be issued quickly and quietly. Although guidance is not legally binding on external parties, agencies often treat it as if it were. This “as if” nature invites political opportunism, wherein guidance is exploited when agencies are politicized through presidential appoint- ments. I demonstrate this argument empirically using a new dataset that evaluates agency guidance production at 29 agencies over a 10-year period. The results show that agencies are more likely to rely on the “quick fix” offered by guidance when they are highly politicized, and that this effect is exacerbated among the most significant forms of guidance. However, certain institutions like increased proceduralization can temper the bias toward political guidance. While often overlooked, the results suggest that guidance is an important venue for political maneuvering.
|Paper|
Congressional Oversight Revisited: Politics and Procedure in Agency Rulemaking
(with Kenneth Lowande)
2021. Journal of Politics. 83(1): 401-408.
Scholars have long acknowledged that legislators strategically employ procedure to advance policy preferences. But evidence for this view is confined to the lawmaking process, omitting an essential function of elected representatives: oversight of executive policymaking. We argue that ex post procedural oversight is also driven by policy disagreement. We demonstrate this by analyzing congressional participation in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency rulemakings from 2007--2017. Using the content of public comments and commenters' political contributions, our study is the first to locate the spatial position of rulemaking proposals. We find that the more ideologically distant the agency proposal, the more likely a request for documents, additional hearings, or more time for public participation. Moreover, these requests are likely to parallel substantive criticisms, and be concentrated among members with experienced staff. These findings imply that---beyond setting the baseline rules of bureaucratic policymaking---well-resourced elected officials leverage procedure during policy implementation.
| Paper | Supporting Information | Replication data |
(with Kenneth Lowande)
2021. Journal of Politics. 83(1): 401-408.
Scholars have long acknowledged that legislators strategically employ procedure to advance policy preferences. But evidence for this view is confined to the lawmaking process, omitting an essential function of elected representatives: oversight of executive policymaking. We argue that ex post procedural oversight is also driven by policy disagreement. We demonstrate this by analyzing congressional participation in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency rulemakings from 2007--2017. Using the content of public comments and commenters' political contributions, our study is the first to locate the spatial position of rulemaking proposals. We find that the more ideologically distant the agency proposal, the more likely a request for documents, additional hearings, or more time for public participation. Moreover, these requests are likely to parallel substantive criticisms, and be concentrated among members with experienced staff. These findings imply that---beyond setting the baseline rules of bureaucratic policymaking---well-resourced elected officials leverage procedure during policy implementation.
| Paper | Supporting Information | Replication data |
Continuity Trumps Change: The First Year of Trump's Administrative Presidency
(with Andrew Rudalevige, Sharece Thrower, and Adam L. Warber)
2019. PS: Political Science and Politics 52(4): 613-619.
From campaign rhetoric to tweets, President Trump has positioned himself as “disrupter in chief,” often pointing to administrative action as the avenue by which he is leaving a lasting mark. However, research on the administrative presidency begins with the premise that all presidents face incentives to use administrative tools to gain substantive or political traction. If, as this work suggests, Trump’s institutional standing differs little from his recent predecessors, then how much of the Trump presidency represents a change from past norms and practices? How much represents continuity, or the perennial dynamics of a far-from-omnipotent executive in an ongoing world of “separate institutions sharing powers” (Neustadt 1990, 29)? To answer this, we track presidential directives and regulatory policy during Trump’s first year in office. We find evidence of continuity, indicating that in its use of administrative tactics to shape policy, the Trump White House largely falls in line with recent presidencies.
| Paper |
(with Andrew Rudalevige, Sharece Thrower, and Adam L. Warber)
2019. PS: Political Science and Politics 52(4): 613-619.
From campaign rhetoric to tweets, President Trump has positioned himself as “disrupter in chief,” often pointing to administrative action as the avenue by which he is leaving a lasting mark. However, research on the administrative presidency begins with the premise that all presidents face incentives to use administrative tools to gain substantive or political traction. If, as this work suggests, Trump’s institutional standing differs little from his recent predecessors, then how much of the Trump presidency represents a change from past norms and practices? How much represents continuity, or the perennial dynamics of a far-from-omnipotent executive in an ongoing world of “separate institutions sharing powers” (Neustadt 1990, 29)? To answer this, we track presidential directives and regulatory policy during Trump’s first year in office. We find evidence of continuity, indicating that in its use of administrative tactics to shape policy, the Trump White House largely falls in line with recent presidencies.
| Paper |
Agency Rulemaking in a Separation of Powers System
(with Charles R. Shipan)
2019. Journal of Public Policy 39(1): 89-113.
Rulemaking gives agencies significant power to change public policy, but agencies do not exercise this power in a vacuum. The separation of powers system practically guarantees that, at times, agencies will be pushed and pulled in different directions by Congress and the president. We argue that these forces critically affect the volume of rules produced by an agency. We develop an account of agency rulemaking in light of these factors and test our hypotheses on a dataset of agency rules from 1995 to 2007. Our results show that even after accounting for factors specific to each agency, agencies do, in fact, adjust the quantity of rules they produce in response to separation of powers oversight. Further analysis shows that the president’s influence is limited to those agencies that he has made a priority.
| Paper | Online Appendix | Replication Files |
(with Charles R. Shipan)
2019. Journal of Public Policy 39(1): 89-113.
Rulemaking gives agencies significant power to change public policy, but agencies do not exercise this power in a vacuum. The separation of powers system practically guarantees that, at times, agencies will be pushed and pulled in different directions by Congress and the president. We argue that these forces critically affect the volume of rules produced by an agency. We develop an account of agency rulemaking in light of these factors and test our hypotheses on a dataset of agency rules from 1995 to 2007. Our results show that even after accounting for factors specific to each agency, agencies do, in fact, adjust the quantity of rules they produce in response to separation of powers oversight. Further analysis shows that the president’s influence is limited to those agencies that he has made a priority.
| Paper | Online Appendix | Replication Files |
Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking
2017. Journal of Politics 79(3): 841-855.
The slow pace of administrative action is arguably a defining characteristic of modern bureaucracy. The reasons proffered for delay are numerous, often centering on procedural hurdles or bureaucrats' ineptitude. I offer a different perspective on delay in one important bureaucratic venue: the federal rulemaking process. I argue that agencies can speed up (fast-track) or slow down (slow-roll) the rulemaking process in order to undermine political oversight by Congress, the president, and the courts. That is, when the political climate is favorable agencies rush to lock in a rule, but when it is less favorable they wait on the chance that it will improve. I find empirical support for this proposition using an event history analysis of more than 11,000 agency rules from 152 bureaus. The results support the interpretation that agencies strategically delay, and that delay is not simply evidence of increased bureaucratic effort.
| Paper | Online Appendix | Replication Files |
2017. Journal of Politics 79(3): 841-855.
The slow pace of administrative action is arguably a defining characteristic of modern bureaucracy. The reasons proffered for delay are numerous, often centering on procedural hurdles or bureaucrats' ineptitude. I offer a different perspective on delay in one important bureaucratic venue: the federal rulemaking process. I argue that agencies can speed up (fast-track) or slow down (slow-roll) the rulemaking process in order to undermine political oversight by Congress, the president, and the courts. That is, when the political climate is favorable agencies rush to lock in a rule, but when it is less favorable they wait on the chance that it will improve. I find empirical support for this proposition using an event history analysis of more than 11,000 agency rules from 152 bureaus. The results support the interpretation that agencies strategically delay, and that delay is not simply evidence of increased bureaucratic effort.
| Paper | Online Appendix | Replication Files |
Organizational Capacity, Regulatory Review, and the Limits of Political Control
(with Alex Bolton and Sharece Thrower)
2016. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 32(2): 242-271.
Studies of administrative politics focus primarily on political control and ignore organizational capacity. We argue that political and organizational factors, as well as the interaction between the two, are necessary for explaining executive policymaking. To test this theory, we consider the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), an agency perceived as the president's political instrument. Using a new dataset of over 35,000 regulations reviewed by OIRA, we demonstrate that political factors influence review lengths, but organizational factors also exhibit a significant role. We find that reviews are longer when OIRA is understaffed and over-worked. Significantly, we demonstrate that low organizational capacity inhibits the president's ability to expedite priority rules. Overall, this study highlights the organizational limits of political control.
| Paper | Online Appendix |
(with Alex Bolton and Sharece Thrower)
2016. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 32(2): 242-271.
Studies of administrative politics focus primarily on political control and ignore organizational capacity. We argue that political and organizational factors, as well as the interaction between the two, are necessary for explaining executive policymaking. To test this theory, we consider the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), an agency perceived as the president's political instrument. Using a new dataset of over 35,000 regulations reviewed by OIRA, we demonstrate that political factors influence review lengths, but organizational factors also exhibit a significant role. We find that reviews are longer when OIRA is understaffed and over-worked. Significantly, we demonstrate that low organizational capacity inhibits the president's ability to expedite priority rules. Overall, this study highlights the organizational limits of political control.
| Paper | Online Appendix |
The Limits of Foreign Aid Diplomacy: How Bureaucratic Design Shapes Aid Distribution
(with Vincent Arel-Bundock & James Atkinson)
2015. International Studies Quarterly 59(3): 544-556
How does the institutional design of a state’s bureaucracy affect foreign policy? We argue that the design of government agencies can moderate bureaucrats’ incentives to act in accordance with an Executive’s diplomatic preferences. Where the Executive can influence budgets or career paths, bureaucrats face incentives to adopt her diplomatic goals as their own. Where agencies are shielded from Executive influence, bureaucrats are free to act independently in a bid to enhance their autonomy and their reputation for competence. To test these expectations, we develop a new measure of bureaucratic independence for the 15 aid-giving agencies in the US government, and analyze how independence affects foreign aid allocation patterns over the 1999–2010 period. We find that in “dependent” agencies, foreign aid flows are tightly linked to the diplomatic objectives of the President. In “independent” agencies, aid flows appear less responsive to presidential priorities and more responsive to indicators of need in the recipient country. Our results highlight limits on the diplomatic use of foreign aid, and emphasize the importance of domestic institutional design. Importantly, our findings have implications across a broad range of foreign policy domains, where multiple government agencies are in charge of implementation.
| Paper | Online Appendix | Replication Files | Agency independence scores |
(with Vincent Arel-Bundock & James Atkinson)
2015. International Studies Quarterly 59(3): 544-556
How does the institutional design of a state’s bureaucracy affect foreign policy? We argue that the design of government agencies can moderate bureaucrats’ incentives to act in accordance with an Executive’s diplomatic preferences. Where the Executive can influence budgets or career paths, bureaucrats face incentives to adopt her diplomatic goals as their own. Where agencies are shielded from Executive influence, bureaucrats are free to act independently in a bid to enhance their autonomy and their reputation for competence. To test these expectations, we develop a new measure of bureaucratic independence for the 15 aid-giving agencies in the US government, and analyze how independence affects foreign aid allocation patterns over the 1999–2010 period. We find that in “dependent” agencies, foreign aid flows are tightly linked to the diplomatic objectives of the President. In “independent” agencies, aid flows appear less responsive to presidential priorities and more responsive to indicators of need in the recipient country. Our results highlight limits on the diplomatic use of foreign aid, and emphasize the importance of domestic institutional design. Importantly, our findings have implications across a broad range of foreign policy domains, where multiple government agencies are in charge of implementation.
| Paper | Online Appendix | Replication Files | Agency independence scores |
